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Acronyms
3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard. 3DES is a 64-bit
block cipher with 168-bit key and 48 rounds, 256
times stronger than DES, and uses three times the
resources to perform the encryption/decryption
process compared to DES [16].
AES Advanced Encryption Standard. AES is based on the
Rijndael cipher. The key size and the block size may
be chosen from of 128, 192, or 256 with a variable
number of rounds [16].
API Application Programming Interface.
BBS Bulletin Board System.
BIOS Basic Input/Output System.
BSD Berkeley Software Distribution. BSD is a Unix
operating system derivative developed and
distributed by the Computer Systems Research Group
of the University of California, Berkeley, from 1977 to
1995 [8].
DES Data Encryption Standard. DES applies a 56-bit key
to each 64-bit block of data. The process involves 16
rounds with major two processes: key and plain
text [16].
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service. DDoS occurs when
multiple systems flood the bandwidth or resources of
a targeted system, usually one or more web
servers [8].
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DLL Dynamic Link Library. Microsoft’s implementation of
the shared library concept.
DNS Domain Name System. DNS is a hierarchical
distributed naming system for computers, services, or
any resource connected to the Internet or a private
network [8].
DOS Disk Operating System.
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm. DSA is a Federal
Information Processing Standard for digital
signatures.
FTP File Transfer Protocol.
HTML HyperText Markup Language.
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol.
IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm. IDEA is a
symmetric-key block cipher. It operates on 64-bit
blocks using a 128-bit key, and eight rounds and an
output transformation (the half-round) [16].
IDS Intrusion Detection System.
IM Instant Messenger.
IRC Internet Relay Chat.
IT Information Technology.
I/O Input/Output.
MARA Mobile Malware Researchers Association.
MBR Master Boot Record. MBR is a special type of boot
sector at the very beginning of partitioned computer
mass storage devices like fixed disks or removable
v
drives intended for use with IBM PC-compatible
systems and beyond [8].
MS-DOS Microsoft Disk Operating System.
NFS Network File System. NFS is a distributed file system
protocol originally developed by Sun Microsystems in
1984, allowing a user on a client computer to access
files over a network much like local storage is
accessed [8].
NTFS New Technology File System. NTFS is a proprietary
file system developed by Microsoft.
OS Operating System.
PEB Process Execution Block. PEB is a data structure in
Win32.
P2P Peer-to-peer. P2P is a type of decentralized and
distributed network architecture in which individual
nodes in the network (called ”peers”) act as both
suppliers and consumers of resources, in contrast to
the centralized clientserver model where client nodes
request access to resources provided by central
servers [8].
PoC Proof of Concept.
PRBG Pseudorandom Bit Generator. PRBG is an algorithm
for generating a sequence of numbers that
approximates the properties of random numbers. In
terms of random number generation, the sequence is
not truly random in that it is completely determined
by a relatively small set of initial values, called the
PRNG’s state, which includes a truly random seed [8].
vi
RAM Random Access Memory. RAM is a volatile memory
used as a fast temporary data storage during
power-on sessions.
RC6 Rivest Cipher 6. RC6 is a symmetric key block cipher
derived from RC5. It was designed by Ron Rivest,
Matt Robshaw, Ray Sidney, and Yiqun Lisa Yin to
meet the requirements of the AES competition [8].
RNG Random Number Generator.
RPC Remote Procedure Call. RPC is an inter-process
communication that allows a computer program to
cause a subroutine or procedure to execute in another
address space without the programmer explicitly
coding the details for this remote interaction [8].
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. RSA is a public key
encryption techology.
SMB Server Message Block. Application level network
protocol which is used for remote access to files,
printers and other network resources. It an be also
used for Inter-Process Communication.
SMS Short Messaging Service.
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol.
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol.
VAX Virtual Address eXtension. VAX is an instruction set
architecture.
UUID Universally Unique Identifier. UUID is an identifier
standard used in software construction.
vii
1 Introduction
Malicious software (malware) tries to interfere in our life more
and more often. Our life changes – we have much more devices
than few years ago which can be under attack. Not only PCs,
but smartphones, tablets and other devices which are running
similar operating systems (OS), such as Windows, Android and
OS X might be under threat. Our life itself is much more
dependent on these devices. These systems carry out more
important tasks than in the past: mobile banking, different
types of embedded systems in cars and other mechanisms,
medical instruments etc. Our privacy and security nowadays
is closely related to correct functioning of mentioned devices.
On the other hand, people who use all systems are less
technically educated than 10 years ago. Lots of them can hardly
imagine the risk and possible danger of malicious software.
Protection strategy and countermeasures are known only by
professionals.
Unspecified behavior caused by malicious software might
affect your plans. That’s why investigating of the current
trends in this area is very important. It can give required
knowledge to improve self-protection.
This Master’s Thesis was inspired by the ideas of current
problem status evaluation, roadmap analysis and protection
against modern attack types.
1.1 COVERED TOPICS
The Thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we start with
introduction to malicious software types. We give a glance at
the past, since it is very important to understand the malware
evolution. Later on in the Thesis it would help us to try to
predict the trend in this area. We also take a closer look on the
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used techniques.
Then in Chapter 3 we review the ways worms and viruses
are used in cryptovirology. First in this chapter we study
main cryptography principles. This is the distinguishing
characteristic for this type of malware and the core idea. Next
we devote some attention to distinctive features, used methods
and specialized countermeasures.
In the subsequent Chapter 4 we describe stealth techniques.
Based on covered topics we discuss possible cryptovirology
roadmap and countermeasures (see Chapter 5).
Appendices contain sources for .BMCODE ransome virus
(see Appendix A). Furthermore delivery and encryption part
are investigated as well as script for decryption is present.
1.2 CREATORS OF MALICIOUS SOFTWARE
Malware creators have different aims. One very popular reason
is boredom and curiosity. The other one is developing malware
”just for fun”. Although this reason may sound funny, it is
rather popular with malware authors who are only interested
in their skills and consequences of a possible outbreak. Yet
another group of virus creators is looking for fame.
One more group of malware creators is formed by skilful
and well-known programmers. Mostly they do research work.
They have very good experience in malicious software, and
they do their work on a very high level. Viruses written
by them use functions which prevent disassembling and thus
make the analysis of the source code more difficult. These
viruses are often made as a research work and do not make
harm. Such viruses are either confidential or used to show the
weak spots.
One of the most dangerous groups of virus creators are
persons embittered at themselves. Neither moral nor damage
is a matter for them. Everyone has his own aim. Usually the
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maximum damage or the world power is the final goal [1].
Some antivirus companies have lately discovered a new
type of malware creators: those having economic goals. This
means that malware development have transformed from
hooliganism to a big business. The business is getting its
profits by the use of other lawless acts, for example spam
[2]. On the other side, Millions and even Billions euros of
losses are often mentioned. However, such estimates should be
treated sceptically, because different companies quote different
numbers, and no computation methods are presented.
1.3 OPERATING SYSTEMS
The number of malicious software existing for a given platform
highly depends on the platform popularity. The more OS is
used, the more malware is written for it. At the beginning
Proof of Concept (PoC) malware is developed, which does not
harm but only shows the possibility of attack. First, some
information about vulnerability in the OS or software appears.
Based on this information, exploits and backdoors which use
the bug are developed. Software developers fix the bug and the
cycle repeats. The malware stream grows like an avalanche.
Now this can be easily seen on the Windows platform. The
other platforms are still much safer but who knows what will
happen tomorrow.
Every new version of Windows gave an impulse for virus
creation. In 1995, when Windows 95 appeared, it was fully pro-
tected against old Disk Operating System (DOS) viruses. Win-
dows applications were a new challenge for virus developers.
Already in August the first virus for Microsoft Word (Concept)
appeared and spread all over the world in a few weeks.
In 1996 the first virus for Windows 95, Win95.Boza ap-
peared. Then new viruses came out quite often, as it can be
seen from Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: List of selected viruses for Windows
95 [3].
Malware name Firstly dis-
covered
Description
Win.Tentacle March 1996 Infected PCs with Win-
dows 3.11. This was the
first epidemic for Windows
PCs.
Laroux July 1996 First virus for Microsoft Ex-
cel.
Win95.Punch December
1996
First resident virus for Win-
dows 95. It was loaded as
a VxD-driver, intercepted
file calls and infected those
files.
Macro viruses for
Office 97
February
1997
Some old viruses for Word
6/7 were converted to a
new format, but in a few
days special viruses for Of-
fice 97 appeared.
ShareFun March 1997 The first macro virus,
which was also a mail-
worm. It sent copies
though MSMail.
Homer April 1997 Network virus for File
Transfer Protocol (FTP)
Win95.Mad June 1997 First self-encrypting virus
for Windows 95
mIRC worms December
1997
First mIRC worm. It spread
via Internet Relay Chat
(IRC) channels.
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Malware name Firstly dis-
covered
Description
Win32.HLLP.De-
Troie
Beginning
of 1998
This virus infected WIN32
executive files but also sent
information to its owner
about the infected PC.
Excel4.Paix February
1998
Infection of formulas in Ex-
cel spreadsheets.
AccessiV March 1998 First Microsoft Access
virus.
Cross March 1998 A virus for two applica-
tions: Microsoft Office Ac-
cess and Word.
Win95.HPS and
Win95.Marburg
February-
March
1998
First polymorphic WIN32
viruses.
Win95.CIH June 1998 This virus is also known
as Chernobyl due to the
date of its activation (April
26). The virus caused one
of the most destructive epi-
demics. Win95.CIH deletes
data on all hard drives and
overwrites Flash Basic In-
put/Output System (BIOS).
This caused physical faults
in more than 100 000 PCs
all over the world.
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Malware name Firstly dis-
covered
Description
BackOrifice (Back-
door.BO)
August
1998
This well known utility
was used for gaining con-
trol over remote PCs and
networks. This was the
first program in a huge se-
ries, continued by NetBus,
Phase and others.
Java.StangeBrew August
1998
Java executable modules
infection. This virus made
no harm for the user, be-
cause it was impossible to
use reproduction functions
on the remote PC.
VBScript.Rabbi November
1998
This is a first virus writ-
ten in Windows Script lan-
guage.
HTML.Internal December
1998
HyperText Markup Lan-
guage (HTML) virus
Melissa The whole
year 1999
This virus beat all spread-
ing records. Melissa is a
combination of macro virus
and a worm.
Gala 1999 Macro virus for CorelDraw
Stuxnet 2010 Stuxnet targets industrial
control systems, which are
used widely in factories,
assembly lines, refineries,
and power plants.
Flame 2012 Most complex, most so-
phisticated and largest
cyber-espionage tool
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The malware list mentioned in Table 1.1 can be easily
continued. It is remarkable that every new application or
technology gets specialized malicious software.
Malware has been developed not only for Windows, but
for other operating systems as well. For example, a virus for
OS/2, OS2.AEP was noticed in June 1996. The virus infects
executable files in OS/2.
The first viruses for the Unix/Linux family were assum-
ably written by F. Cohen (computer scientist) during his exper-
iments. On November 10, 1983, the first virus was presented
at a weekly seminar on computer security. It demonstrated
the feasibility of viral attack and the degree on which it was a
threat [4]. In the late 1980s first publications with source code
for viruses written in sh language appeared [5] [6].
The first worm [3] appeared in 1988 in Unix. Snoopy and
Bliss were written in C and can be easily transferred to any
Unix system.
The year 2007 brought new malware. Mobile Malware
Researchers Association (MARA) discovered an example of a
virus which is able to infect both PCs and communicators. The
new virus is called Crossover Virus. Still there are no examples
of infection. This malware works on PCs with 32-bit versions of
Windows and on smartphones with Windows CE or Windows
Mobile. After the activation Crossover Virus checks the version
of the host OS. If it is not Windows CE or Windows Mobile,
then it adds itself to the autorun key registry. This happens
every time the system starts, degrading the PC’s performance.
Crossover Virus waits in Random Access Memory (RAM) for
a connection with portable equipment thought ActiveSync and
sends its copy to the communicator. Then virus deletes all files
in ”My Documents” folder on the smartphone.
On February 27, 2006, Kaspersky Lab [3] reported about a
new trojan called Redbrowser, which works in mobile phones
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with Java support. The trojan starts to send Short Messaging
Service (SMS) messages from the infected phone to paid mobile
services. Every message costs 5-6 cents.
On April 6, 2006, Kaspersky Lab [3] reported about new
malware Virus.Linux.Bi.a / Virus.Win32.Bi.a. It has a double
name due to its properties. It can infect both Windows and
Linux systems and shows the abilities of cross platform viruses.
Bi.a is written in an assembler language. It infects ELF and
PE files in the folder where it is run. Bi.a has no destructive
functions. The source code of Bi.a can be used in the future
by intruders for malware development. The virus was sent
anonymously to the laboratory for analysis. No computer
infection has been notified yet.
The last examples show the fast development in this sphere.
The history shows that for new platforms, malware is often
developed within a short time. Moreover, it shows that we
cannot feel absolutely secure running any operating system.
There are two more viruses which I have been already
mentioned in Table 1.1, but I wish to devote bit more attention
to them.
Stuxnet was first time detected in July 2010. It spread for
several months before discovery and it should already archived
its intended target [39, 40].
Stuxnet targets industrial control systems, which are used
widely in factories, assembly lines, refineries, and power
plants. It attacks Windows PCs that program specific Siemens
programmable logic controllersspecialized computers that con-
trol automated physical processes, such as robot arms, in com-
mon industrial control systems [40].
This virus is larger and more complex than any other
malware before. It used four zero-day exploits. Multiple
languages are used. It was digitally signed by two legitimate
certificates [39, 41]. Its sophistication suggests that the creators
had detailed knowledge of its target and access to immense
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resources, perhaps with government backing. Its choice of
targets also suggests a political motive. The development
time could be 5 to 10 people working for six months with
access to Scada systems [40]. Viruses before Stuxnet were
stealing, manipulating or erasing information, but its goal was
to physically destroy a military target – not just metaphorically,
but literally [41].
50,000 to 100,000 computers were infected. Countries which
were mostly affected: Iran (58 percent), Indonesia, India,
and Azerbaijan. The main guess is that the Irans nuclear-
enrichment program was a target for that virus. Iranian
officials have denied that Stuxnet has caused any damage to
the nuclear plants main systems [42].
Flame is also suspected to be a statesponsored cyberattack.
This virus was discovered in 2012, but its development was
started few years before. It seems that Flame’s developers
collaborated with Stuxnet’s authors [26].
Flame is complex, most sophisticated and largest cyber-
espionage tool. It consists of about 20 modules in total. It
can take computer screenshots and log keyboard activity. It
uses five different encryption methods and three different com-
pression algorithms. Flame can connect to various Command
and Control servers. It can scrape any wi-fi and network traf-
fic for usernames and passwords. Flame is so advanced, it
utilises sophisticated technology to detect all major traditional
antivirus software on the market, tracking a list of 346 different
processes used in order to alter its activity to avoid antivirus
detection [38].
Flame used valid, signed - but spoofed - Microsoft security
certificate. Virus went undetected for more than two years [38].
The last examples demonstrate numerous flaws in tradi-
tional IT security systems. Cybercrime advances, and bad guys
continue to develop ways to overcome standard security mech-
anisms.
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In this Chapter we take a close look on common malware
types. Section 2.1 gives viruses overview. Section 2.2 contains
information about worms.
2.1 VIRUSES
”A virus is a self-replicating piece of code that attaches itself
to other programs and usually requires human interaction to
propagate” [7].
A virus can only spread from one computer to another
when its host is taken to the uninfected computer. Addition-
ally, viruses can spread to other computers by infecting files
on a network file system or a file system that is accessed by
another computer [8].
A computer virus can be created with the same software
development tools as any other software. Typically viruses are
written in assembly language to make them small and efficient.
A virus can be created in any programming language that
allows file Input/Output (I/O).
File I/O means that the programming language provides
methods for storing information after the program has been
terminated. This technique has many advantages: small
program size, modularity and persistent data retrieval. All
these preferences are used by viruses.
Virus has to have a permission to execute code and to
write into memory. Virus needs these permissions to have an
opportunity to replicate itself. This is the reason why many
viruses attach themselves to executable files [8].
To understand viruses better I start with historical overview
in Section 2.1.1, continue with viruses classification in Section
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2.1.2. Next Section 2.1.3 describes the ways viruses do their job.
Finally, countermeasures are covered in Section 2.1.4.
2.1.1 History
It is often falsely said that first viruses appeared in the 1970s or
even in the 1960s. Famous programs at that time were Animal,
Creeper, Cookie Monster and Xerox worm [8]. ”Animal” is a
game. The main point of the game is guessing an animal.
The main distinction of ”Animal” is that it logs and tries
to analyze previous answers. The last version of the game
wrote itself to PCs without users’ permission. Creeper is a
self-relocating program. This program was moving from PC
to PC, removing its previous versions. Cookie Monster is a
Chris Tavares’ program. It was written in 1970 for IBM 2741
with Multics OS. Program wrote a terminal message ”Give
me a cookie” and locked the terminal till user wrote the word
”cookie”. Cookie Monster is mistakenly called a virus due to the
style of realization. Multics has a feature that allows programs
to set a timer and then terminate. When the timer runs out,
the program is started, and it looks like it was a terminal call.
So the user could think that the stopped program was infected.
Cookie Monster was written in PL/I. Xerox worm was a worm
program for distributed computations [10]. The idea was to
use all inactive PCs in a network for computations. This worm
occupied PC during idle periods, and then saved work and
freed resources when computer was needed for everyday work.
A new era of computer virus history started in 1977,
when Apple II appeared and computer networks became more
common. All the programs described before can be called
annoying but the first harmful programs were developed later.
Looking like useful programs they were uploaded to Bulletin
Board System (BBS), and when executed they destroyed all
user’s data. At the same time new types of viruses appeared.
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They worked like a time bomb and ruined all data on user’s
disk after some time delay or when some extra condition held
true.
In February 1980, a student of Dortmund university, Jur-
gen Kraus, finished his work on the topic ”Self-replicating pro-
grams” (”Selbstreproduktion bei programmen”). In addition to
theoretical foundations, this work included some source code
of self-replicating programs for IBM/360 [11]. The examples
which were examined in this work were not viruses in the strict
meaning of the word, but they had influence on the future re-
search. The first real viruses are ”Virus” versions 1,2 and 3
written by Joe Dellinger and ”Elk Cloner” written by Richard
Skrenta for PC Apple II [3]. Both of them are quite close in
functionality but they were developed independently in 1981.
The next step of the computer virus history is the time
when quite cheap IBM PC started to spread widely. This
happened in 1987 few years later than they appeared on the
market. Computers widespread zoomed virus infection. In
1987 three computer virus epidemics broke out.
The first epidemic in 1987 was produced by the Brain virus
(also known as Pakistan virus). This virus was developed
by two brothers, Amjat and Basit Faroog Alvi and firstly
discovered in January 1986. According to McAfee, this virus
had infected more than 18 000 computers in USA. This
program had to punish pirates stealing Amjat’s and Basit
Faroog Alvi’s company’s software. It also included names,
addresses and phone numbers of its developers. It was
unexpected that the virus crossed the Pakistan border and
infected hundreds of computers all over the world. Brain is
also the first stealth virus (see Section 2.1.2) [3].
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2.1.2 Classifications
No strict commonly accepted computer virus classification
exists at the moment. In the literature the following features
have been used for dividing malicious software into groups
[14]:
Classification according to the habitat divides viruses into
file viruses, bootable viruses and macro viruses. File viruses
intrude into executable files (*.com, *.exe, *.sys, *.bat, *.bin,
*.dll). Bootable viruses break into the boot sector or into the
Master Boot Record (MBR) of a hard Drive. Macro viruses
intrude the systems which use macros (for example Microsoft
Word, Excel). Different combinations are also possible. For
example, bootable file viruses intrude into files and boot
sectors.
Classification according to the habitat infecting way di-
vides viruses into resident and nonresident. A resident virus
leaves its resident part (replication module) in RAM. This part
intercepts all the OS calls and infects every suitable program
that is executed on the computer. Resident viruses are active
all the time when computer is switched on and the OS is run-
ning.
Non-resident viruses do not interfere with RAM and they
are active only during short periods of time. A non-resident
virus consists of a finder module and a replication module.
The finder module is responsible for finding new files to infect.
When the finder module comes across a new executable file, it
calls the replication module to infect that file.
Viruses can be categorised according to destructive fea-
tures into harmless, not dangerous and dangerous. Harmless
viruses only occupy free space on the hard drive. Not danger-
ous viruses occupy RAM, leading to a potential deceleration of
resource-intensive services. Dangerous viruses can cause seri-
ous malfunction of software, data destruction, and removal of
critical system information.
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Classification according to the algorithm properties di-
vides viruses into overwriting, companion worms, parasitical, stu-
dents’, stealth, polymorphic, metamorphic code, macro-viruses and
network viruses
Overwriting viruses replace original executable files with
their own code. The name of the file is not changed so the
virus starts every time when the program is invoked.
Companion viruses create ”companion” files with *.com
extension for executable *.exe files. When a program is called
in DOS, and the extension is not specified, DOS firstly starts the
*.com file, which in turn starts a virus and its *.exe companion.
The virus may also move the original file somewhere or rename
it.
A worm is a type of companion virus. Worms do not
associate themselves with other files. They create their copies
on other drives and folder. Often attractive names are used
(Game.exe, install.exe) to make users to execute this file.
Worms do not change other files and do not use the com-exe
trick.
Parasitical viruses change content of hard drive sectors and
files during their expansion. Changed programs keep their
efficiency
Stealth viruses are adroitly made programs which intercept
OS calls to infected sectors or files and return uninfected
content. These viruses use sly algorithms to cheat resident
antivirus monitors. The virus can return an uninfected version
of the file to the antivirus software, so that it seems that the
file is ”clean”. The only completely reliable method to avoid
stealth viruses is to boot from a medium that is known to be
clean.
Polymorphic viruses are hardly detected. This was the
first technique that posed a serious threat to virus scanners.
Polymorphic viruses do not contain any constant parts of their
code or data. Two copies of the same virus will not contain
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similarities. Virus body ciphering and different versions of the
decoding program are used. A polymorphic virus infects files
with encrypted copies of itself. The decryption module, which
is used for decoding the virus copies, is also modified in each
infected file. It is impossible to detect a polymorphic virus
using signatures. Antivirus software can detect polymorphic
viruses by decrypting them using an emulator, or by statistical
pattern analysis of the encrypted virus bodies. To enable
polymorphic code, the virus has to have a polymorphic engine
somewhere in its encrypted body [8].
A virus can be programmed to mutate only slightly over
time, or it can be programmed to refrain from mutating when
it infects a file on a computer that already contains copies of
the virus. The advantage of using such slow polymorphic code
is that it makes it more difficult for antivirus professionals to
obtain representative samples of the virus, because bait files
that are infected in one run will typically contain identical or
similar samples of the virus. This will make the detection
by the virus scanner unreliable, and as a result of this, some
instances of the virus may be able to avoid detection [8].
Metamorphic code is used to make the detection by emu-
lators harder. Metamorphic code is code that can reprogram
itself. A virus that uses such code can reprogram itself every
time when the secrecy policy needs this. This policy is defined
in a virus and sets some rules for keeping hided. This can
happen even every time when the virus infects new executa-
bles. To enable metamorphic code, a metamorphic engine is
used. This increases virus size greatly. Metamorphic part may
take up to 90% of the virus code. W32/Simile consisted of over
14000 lines of assembly code, 90% of it part of the metamorphic
engine [8].
Macro viruses use macro languages (such as Word Basic)
built in data processing systems. Microsoft Word and Excel
macro viruses are widely spread.
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Network viruses spread in computer networks. They do
not change any data or sectors content. They load into RAM,
collect network information and copy themselves to other
computers on the network. Sometimes temporary files are
created but mostly only RAM in used. This type of viruses is
not prevalent. A good example is XMasTree. File viruses and
macro viruses can infect networks, but they cannot be named
network viruses because they do not use network protocols or
software bugs, but distribute through infected shared files on
servers and workstations [9].
2.1.3 How Viruses Work?
All viruses have same way to archive their goal. It can be
described in a few steps (see Figure 2.1):
Common Actions of Viruses
Replication: The virus infects other files. It searches for the
appropriate file type every time when the host program is
executed.
Hiding: Virus creators do their best to make viruses invis-
ible for the antivirus software. Different viruses use different
methods to hide their existence. I’ll describe them in the next
paragraph.
Events watching: The virus checks for specific conditions
every time when it is executed. If those conditions exist then
the virus starts.
Delivery: When some extra conditions hold true, the virus
starts its main functionality. It may bring hard, send spam or
anything else.
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Figure 2.1: The way virus works [7]
Hiding Techniques
In order to avoid detection by users, viruses use different
techniques. Some old viruses, especially those developed for
the Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS) platform leave
the ”last modified” date of a host file unchanged when the
file is infected by the virus. This trick does not fool antivirus
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software. Some viruses can infect files without increasing their
sizes or damaging the files. They achieve this by overwriting
unused areas of executable files. For example, the CIH virus, or
Chernobyl Virus, infects Portable Executable files, which have
many empty gaps. The virus is 1 KB in length, and it is stored
in the gaps, keeping the size of the original file intact. Modern
viruses prevent detection attempts by forcibly killing the tasks
associated with the virus scanners before they can detect the
viruses [8].
As computers and operating systems grow larger and more
complex, old hiding techniques need to be updated or replaced
by self-modification. Most modern antivirus programs try to
find viruses in ordinary programs by scanning them for so-
called virus signatures. A signature is a characteristic byte-
pattern that is part of a certain virus or family of viruses. If
antivirus software finds such a pattern in a file that means
that file is infected. Some viruses use techniques that make
detection by signatures difficult or impossible. These viruses
modify their code on each infection. So, each infected file
contains a different variant of the virus [8].
Simple self-modification is used by some old viruses which
modify themselves only in really simple ways. For example,
some of them exchange subroutines in their code. Currently, it
makes no problem for virus scanners to detect such viruses.
Encryption with a variable key is an advanced self-
modification method that uses simple encryption to encipher
the virus. The virus consists of a small decrypting module and
an encrypted copy of the virus code. Only decrypting module
remains constant is this case. In this case, a virus scanner can-
not detect the virus itself using signatures, but it can still detect
the decrypting module. This makes detection using signatures
of encrypted viruses possible.
In most cases a random 1-byte key is XORed with each
byte of the virus. This method has an additional advantage:
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encryption and decryption are made in the same way.
Avoiding bait files and other undesirable hosts help viruses
to stay unnoticed. A virus needs to infect hosts in order to
spread further. But infecting the host makes the detection easy.
Integrity check of their own code helps anti-virus programs to
detect virus easily. So, some viruses are programmed not to
infect ”black list” programs.
Sometimes viruses avoid bait files. Bait files are guinea-pig
files specially created by antivirus software. These files may
be created for various reasons. All of them are related to the
detection of the virus. Bait files are described in section 2.1.4.
Since bait files are used to detect the virus, or to make
detection possible, a virus tries its best to avoid infecting them.
Viruses typically do this by avoiding suspicious programs,
such as small program files or programs that contain certain
patterns of ”garbage instructions”.
Randomization can be used to confuse antivirus software.
Sometimes, viruses do not infect a host file that would be a
suitable candidate for infection in other circumstances. A virus
can decide on a random basis whether to infect a file or not, or
a virus can only infect host files on particular days of the week.
2.1.4 Countermeasures
All countermeasures are based on the knowledge of virus
structure and the way they are working. To fight viruses one
should know the enemy perfectly.
A right strategy should be used to resist computer virus
attacks. Many users install antivirus software that can detect
and eliminate known viruses. Viruses may be detected when
the computer downloads or runs the executable. Antivirus
software examines the contents of the computer’s memory and
the files stored on fixed or removable drives. It compares
those files against a known virus ”signatures” database. Some
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antivirus programs are able to scan opened files ”on the fly”.
This practice is called ”on-access scanning”. Antivirus software
does not change the underlying capability of host software
to transmit viruses. There have been attempts to do this but
adoption of such antivirus solutions can void the warranty for
the host software. Users must update their software (not only
antivirus) regularly to patch security holes. Antivirus software
also needs to be regularly updated in order to get information
about the latest threats [8].
Bait files usage is one of the countermeasures. There are
several reasons to use them. First, if a bait file contains a
sample of a virus, it is more practical to work with a small
infected file. It is harder to analyze big application programs.
Second, bait files may be used to study the behaviour of a virus.
Changes may be analyzed and detection methods can be tested.
This is especially useful when the virus is polymorphic. The
virus should infect a lot of bait files to give a big amount of
information to analyze. The virus scanner can then be tested
whether it can detect the virus in all these files. Third, some
antivirus software often checks its bait files. If these files are
modified, then the software alerts the user about virus activity
[8].
Another popular countermeasure is based on virus signa-
tures (see Figure 2.2). Signature is like a virus ”fingerprint”. It
is a unique string of bits, or a binary pattern, of a virus. An-
tivirus companies collect signatures and then use them in virus
scans.
2.1.5 Summary
Viruses are very destructive programs. They are often ex-
tended to worms, trojan horses and other sorts of malware.
We’ll take a closer look on worms in next Section 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Virus signature might look like this.
2.2 WORMS
The previous section focused on computer viruses in general.
This section describes worms, which can be classified as a
separate malware group or just as a subgroup of viruses.
In any case, a worm can be defined as a malware which
spreads through a network. Of course, some worms meet all
characteristics of viruses, for instance, they infect host files.
Currently, most viruses behave like worms in that they spread
through the Internet for wider distribution. At the time, worm
is the most popular malware [3].
”A worm is a self-replicating piece of code that spreads
via network and usually does not require user interaction to
propagate” [7] Worms may use different spreading techniques.
Some of them need user’s action to start. It can be just opening
of an infected message in an e-mail client. Other worms
can spread without user participation, doing all their actions
automatically. Sometimes we come across worms which have
a big variety of spread vectors, victim selection strategies and
even exploits for different operation systems.
Worms do not need any program to be attached to. A worm
harms a network unlike viruses which corrupt files. Network
harm can be seen even in bandwidth decrease.
A worm gets control over one machine and uses it as
a starting point to gain control of other vulnerable systems.
When they are conquered, spreading continues. This process
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is recursive, and a worm can control thousands of computers.
The number of infected systems increases exponentially. One
worm copy running on an infected computer is called a
segment. The same worm on another machine is still the same
worm but the other segment.
The name worm was used for describing such activity for
the first time in the science fiction book ”Shockwave Rider” by
John Brunner in 1972.
The differences between worms and viruses are represented
in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Differences between worms and
viruses. [7].
Virus Worm
Replication Self-replicating Self-replicating
Spread Infects some host
file
Through network (in-
ternal or internet)
User’s partic-
ipation
Typically re-
quired (for
example, open
document/run
program)
Typically not required.
Misconfigurations and
vulnerabilities of tar-
get systems are used.
Sometimes some user
interaction is required
(for example, opening
an e-mail)
Worms are often used to attack systems. They can easily
scale and this is a great advantage that other attack types
cannot achieve. Worms use the same advantage as distributed
networks have [10]. This number of segments is used by
attacker to archive different goals. It can be control over a
big number of systems, increasing damage, besides it makes
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search for the attacker much more difficult. This is a small list
how a great amount of computers can be used:
• Crack a password or encryption key
• Attack on the web site
– 100 stronger attack
– 100 faster attack
– It is impossible to resist such attack it can be 100,
1000, 10000, . . . stronger.
• It is close to impossible to catch an attacker if he is careful
• And, of course, fame and boasting
Going into worms details we first make a history overview
in Section 2.2.1, continue with worms’ structure and algorithms
description in Section 2.2.2. Worms’ types are reviewed in
Section 2.2.3. Finally, countermeasures are covered in Section
2.2.4.
2.2.1 History
One of the most well known computer worms is ”Morris
worm”. Is was written by Robert Morris, who was a student
of Cornell university. The spread started on 2 November 1988.
Worm infected many computers connected to the Internet all
over the world. The worm was not developed as a destructive
thing but it happened that all the traffic of ARPANET was
taken by it.
It was a small bug which brought to such big destructions.
Computers were infected multiple times, leading to the denial
of service at many of them. The worm used a well known
vulnerability in Sendmail services, Finger, and rsh/rexec, and
looped through a small password list. At the end of the 1980s,
no one was really afraid of network attacks and passwords
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were not strong enough. The worm used camouflage to hide
itself. It deleted its own executable file, renamed its process
to sh and forked every three minutes. The source code of the
warm can be found at [13].
According to the author’s plans, the worm should have
infected only Virtual Address eXtension (VAX) computers
running 4 Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) and Sun 3
operating systems. However, as the worm was written in C,
it could also run on other computers.
This first epidemic showed that network security standards
at that time were not high enough. New standards were
developed for networking, program development, passwords
management, and network server administration.
Another, even older, worm was created by Bob Thomas in
1971. It was called Cheeper. This program could move from
system to system, copying its code to new infected computers.
Cheeper did not install multiple copies of itself to computers.
Instead, it just migrated from system to system removing all its
footprints. [3]
A year later a real self-replacing, network spreading worm
appeared. It was developed by Xerox PARC. This famous
company did not plan to use it as a malicious software. It was
developed as an efficient way to spread software. It showed its
power in Xerox laboratory network [3].
Nowadays, worms are used to spread malware, infecting
hundreds of thousands machines. The next section gives
examples of various worms, explain their work strategies and
envisions the nearest future.
2.2.2 Worm Components and Algorithms
Worms are commonly constructed from a set of parts shown in
Fig. 2.3 [7]. The warhead is used, obviously, to hit a target.
The propagation engine helps a worm to reach its goal. The
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target selection algorithm and scanning engine are parts of worms
control structures. A payload causes damage to a target.
The warhead’s aim is to gain an access to the victim
computer. It is a piece of code which uses some defects and
weaknesses of the target machine. The warhead may know a
number of possible flaws in the target.
One of the most popular techniques used by warheads is
based on buffer overflow exploits. Buffer overflows originate
from errors made by developers. When a programmer forgets
to check the size of some data before putting it into a memory
buffer, this can lead to a vulnerability. The vulnerability gives
a way for an attacker to undermine the program and gain an
access to the target computer. An attacker who wishes to use
such flaw sends more data than the developer allocated buffer
space for. If a buffer is overflowed, some critical memory
structures can be damaged. Using such technique the attacker
can execute instructions on the victim machine.
Another popular technique is file-sharing attacks. If a
computer under attack uses Windows file sharing or Unix
Network File System (NFS) for reading or writing files through
a network, this can be exploited. Also popular peer-to-peer file-
sharing programs such as Gnutella, Kazaa, E-mule, Bittorent
and others allow sharing files through the network. It is hard
to set right permissions for appropriate people in file-sharing
systems. Some worms use these file-sharing services to access
the target computer’s file system. A worm can write a new
file or overwrite a file available for sharing. For example, the
entire worm can be inside this file. The file can be later run by a
user or scheduled to run automatically. There are many worms
that use this technique, Nimda being a well known example of
them.
A worm can try to get into a system also through e-mail.
However, in most cases a user’s action is required. Sometimes
infection can be performed using scripts but it happens not so
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Figure 2.3: Structure of a worm [7]
often. A small number of worms can be executed automatically
inside e-mail readers with scripts. Furthermore, flaws in mail
server software can be exploited, with no intervention by users
required. The worm can then be sent to a large list of users.
E-mail is therefore an ideal way to enter the system. There is
a huge list of the worms which use such technique: Melissa,
Love Bug, Nimda and others.
Worms can also exploit common misconfigurations. System
administrators and users often make the same mistakes, for
example, by setting easily guessable passwords. A worm’s
warhead can contain a list of most popular passwords and
automatically loop through it to gain an access. It is common
for new worms to use backdoors left by previous worms.
The propagation engine is used to transfer the whole worm
body to the target. This is needed only in the case when
the warhead itself does not contain the body. In file-sharing
warheads worms easily write themselves to the target systems.
In e-mail warheads the attached script usually contains the
whole worm. In other cases the warhead just opens a door for
the worm. Various methods which can be used are presented
in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Worm propagation methods using
file transfer protocols [7].
File Transfer Pro-
gram
Description
FTP Files are moved through the network,
with clear-text user ID, password authen-
tication or anonymous access.
Trivial File
Transfer Pro-
tocol (TFTP)
Trivial FTP supports unauthenticated ac-
cess to move files across the network.
HyperText
Transfer Pro-
tocol (HTTP)
Commonly used to access Web, but also
used for file transfer.
Server Message
Block (SMB)
Microsoft’s Server Message Block: Win-
dows file sharing, Unix servers with
Samba
If the whole worm is on the victim machine then the worms
target selection mechanism starts to look for a new victim. The
target selection algorithm logs all the addresses it finds. All
addresses will be scanned later for vulnerabilities. Different
selection techniques are used. Host lists (/etc/hosts on Unix
and LMHOSTS on Windows) can be found and on some
machines. Lists of e-mail addresses saved in e-mail clients or
at e-mail servers can be used at other machines. In addition,
on Unix machines, a worm can easily see trusted relationships
between the current computer and others (/etc/hosts.equiv
and users’ .rhosts files). It is very insecure to set such relations
but some users do this to access other machines without
passwords. One more technique is to use a local Domain Name
System (DNS) server and query it for the network addresses of
other victims. Also Windows network neighbourhood can be
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explored by worms for potential victims. Finally, a worm can
just randomly select a victim address. In this case an algorithm
for calculating suitable values is used.
The scanning engine uses addresses found by the target
selection mechanism. The worm scans through the addresses
in order to find a vulnerable victim. The scanning engine sends
a few packets to a potential target to see whether the warhead
exploits would work. If they work, the worm spreads to the
new victim and the whole process repeats.
A worm’s payload is a piece of code made to execute some
actions on behalf of the attacker on the attacked computer.
Some worms do not have a payload: all they do is spreading
to other computers. Such worms with null payload are written
just for fame. Other worms can perform more nasty actions as
their payload, for example those given in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Examples of worm payloads [7].
Action Description
Open a backdoor The worm plants a backdoor that gives
the attacker full control of the target
system. This can be a complete remote
access with GUI or just a command shell.
Most of such worms do their best to hide
themselves. For example, Trojan horse
tricks and RootKit mechanisms are used.
Distributed DoS
Agent
This type of payload is often called ”zom-
bie”. Zombies wait for the attacker to or-
der them to start a flood attack on a vic-
tim. This causes an enormous bandwidth
consumption.
Send spam The same as the previous but ”zombies”
are used to send spam.
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Action Description
Performing Com-
plex Mathemati-
cal Operations
Cracking an encryption key, searching
for a password, performing a brute-force
attack.
Cause damage to
files
The payload can change or cause damage
to files on the victim computer, or substi-
tute web pages on the web server.
2.2.3 Types of Worms
Most often, worms have exploits for only one or a few
operating systems. In the nearest future, however, superworms
may potentially attack a big variety of operating system
types. They might exploit a number of different vulnerabilities,
spread faster and have polymorphic features. In this section,
the potential for future worms is examined.
Multiexploit worms. Most of the currently existing worms
exploit only a single vulnerability for spreading but some new
worms can penetrate using a large number of vulnerabilities.
5, 10, 20, or even more vulnerabilities might be exploited by a
single worm. All of them are wrapped into one warhead. Such
a warhead can help a worm to spread more successfully. Even
if a system is patched against some holes, it is enough to have
a single unpatched one, and the multiexploit worm will use it.
Nimda is a good example of such worm.
Zero-day exploits. Freshly discovered vulnerabilities can take
some time for the security community to analyze and patch. If
a worm uses such a zero-day exploit for which there are no
patches available, it can compromise millions of systems.
Fast-spreading worms. Generally all worms try to spread
quickly but in the beginning most of them are quite slow. They
often spread on an exponential basis, and after the launch it
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takes hours or days for them to start spreading faster. Fast-
spreading worms use another technique. An attacker prescans
the Internet from some starting system looking for computers
that are vulnerable to the exploit code. As a result of the
scan, the attacker has a list of thousands of vulnerable systems
without exploiting and taking them over yet. At the launch,
the worm infects a few victims from the list and then divides
up the list among the attacked computers. In this situation the
initial spread is minimized, and no time is wasted.
Polymorphic worms. Virus creators do not wish their worms
to be detected, filtered and analyzed. Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (IDS) tools can easily identify usual worms. Most network-
based IDS tools use databases of known attack signatures. IDS
tools compare network traffic against known signatures and
determine malicious traffic. To avoid detection and bypass IDS
filters worm creators use polymorphic techniques (see Section
2.1.2). They change their code each time when they are run. A
worm’s payload automatically morphs the entire worm and a
few new mutant versions appear. Now the signature is differ-
ent but it still has the same functionality.
Metamorphic worms. In addition to changing the code, the
worm’s behaviour might be dynamically changed. Metamor-
phic worms spread hiding their payload with obfuscation and
encryption techniques (see Figure 2.4).
Worms can be also classified according to the way of
spreading. E-mail worms spread via e-mails. Usually a
message body or attachment contains the worm’s code but it
is also possible that there is only a link to an external web
resource in the message. A user should open the attachment,
therefore ”social engineering” is used to make the attachment
look interesting. Attractive topics are used. Message can look
like a real letter from a person to person. If a worm is activated,
it will send itself using local e-mail system or directly using
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). Worms typically fake
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Figure 2.4: Polymorphic and metamorphic components added to the worm [7]
the senders’ addresses. Instant messaging worms use Instant
Messenger (IM) applications to send links to external web
recourses. Everyone in a contact list can be infected by opening
the link. IRC worms work in a way similar to IM worms, but
are less effective. A file or link can be sent, but the user should
confirm receipt, save the file and open it to get infected. File-
sharing network worms place their copies to shared folders under
attractive names. Now everybody can download the worm via
the Peer-to-peer (P2P) network.
Internet worms target low level Transmission Control Pro-
tocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) ports directly. A good ex-
ample is ”Blaster”, which used a vulnerability in Microsoft’s
Remote Procedure Call (RPC). This worm scanned random
machines on the local network and the Internet, trying to reach
port 135 and spread to remote computers if possible.
RAM-resident worms are located in RAM and do not use
hard drives [12]. They can infect running applications. One
can easily get rid of them by restarting the machine. A RAM-
resident worm contains an exploit and a small payload. Both
parts are located in RAM. A characteristic property of such
worms is that they should use Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs)
already loaded by other applications.
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Worms of yet another class save their code on the hard drive
after successful memory infection, and make sure they will
get started after reboot by writing autorun keys or creating
Windows registry entries. Antivirus software should be used
to get rid of them. The infection part often contains a small
payload which is loaded to RAM and can upload all the
necessary parts from the network. Some worms contain TFTP
clients for such purposes.
2.2.4 Countermeasures
Antivirus software should be always used but it cannot provide
full security. Users should anyway keep antivirus software up-
to-date, otherwise it becomes useless. Also other necessary
actions should not be forgotten. Many software vendors
implement automatic software updates, and it should be
used whenever possible, since up-to-date software includes all
available patches. In a company security team should test all
patches before applying them.
Accidental outbound connections should be blocked. In
addition, there should be a possibility to isolate a network part
if there is a worm. Although this can stop some processes run
by an office or department, the security team should have a
flexible possibility to do this.
It can be dangerous to develop or play with malicious
software, even if it is not meant to make harm. Quite many
examples are known when worms escaped from their creators
and brought hundreds of networks down all over the world.
If an ethical worm is to be developed, the area it can possibly
attack must be limited and escape from the local network made
impossible.
Worms spread using vulnerabilities in software or users’
reach help. The basic secure principles are: anti-spyware
software can be helpful and user should be on the alert opening
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unexpected e-mails, especially with attached files. Never visit
web sites from e-mail links.
2.2.5 Summary
Development of worms is now a big business, and many inci-
dents may happen in the close future. Worms can potentially
even disable the Internet for days, making mail services, web
pages and DNS system unavailable. All possible countermea-
sures should be taken into account to avoid attacks.
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3 Cryptovirology
Cryptography is supposed to allow secure information storage
and support privacy in communication. Modern cryptography
uses wide list of cryptographic algorithms. More than a
dozen of algorithms can be used to archive different goals.
Cryptographic basis are discribed in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 is
devoted to ransomware – the malware type which is common
for cryptovirology. Next Section 3.3 deals with anti-virus
techniques which are common for that virus type.
3.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
Next Sections are talking about cryptography fundamentals:
symmetric (see Section 3.1.1), asymmetric (see Section 3.1.2)
cryptography and random number generators (see Section
3.1.3).
3.1.1 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric cryptography algorithms use same key for encrypt-
ing and decrypting the message. This is the basic principle and
the name ”symmetric” comes out of it. Key should be kept in
secret.
Most popular algorithms are Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES), Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple Data En-
cryption Standard (3DES), Rivest Cipher 6 (RC6), Twofish and
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA). They may be
classified by 6 characteristics: algorithm strength, key length,
quantity of rounds, block length, implementation and process-
ing complexity.
Symmetric algorithms are quite old and well studied. This
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method was the only one until asymmetric cryptography
was invented. Both approaches have the advantages and
disadvantages.
Symmetric algorithms advantages are speed, easiness to
implement. Key length is smaller to archive same strength.
Also age can be named as an advantage, because lots of time
was used to study different approaches. Keys management is
a big problem of symmetric cryptography. If network has 10
user, than you will need 45 key pairs. If network increases up to
100 users than key pairs quantity will be 4950. Keys should be
delivered safety and secure to every party. This is not so easy
to archive and currently it is widely used that session key (for
symmetric algorithm) is delivered asymmetrically encrypted.
One more feature of symmetric cryptography is that it does
allow determining authorship.
3.1.2 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography was invented to overcome the sym-
metric cryptography disadvantages. This approach is also
known as public-key cryptography because it does not require
secure initial key exchange between sender and receiver. Key
pair (secret private key and published public key) is used for
archiving the goal. Pair is generated using a large random
number. These key are mathematically related. Way the key is
generated depends on the algorithm.
Keys can be used in two ways: to deliver a secure message
and to prove authorship. In first case message is encrypted
with receivers public key and can be decrypted only by this
persons marching private key. This approach is used for
confidentiality. To prove authorship person should encrypt a
message with his private key. In this case everyone would be
able to decrypt and be sure that message belongs to a person
whose public key resolves it.
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Although asymmetric cryptography is quite young there
is a wide list of available algorithms: Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman (RSA), Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Diffie-
Hellmann, Rabin and others.
I have already mentioned some advantages: no need in
secure key exchange, extra functionality. I cannot skip few
more. Key life is bigger - it can be use for a huge period of time
while symmetric key should be changed after each session.
• Symmetric algorithm can be easily changed. Asymmetric
cannot.
• Public key length should be bigger to achieve same
strength.
Table 3.1: Differences between symmetric and
public key length.
Symmetric key length, bit Public key length, bit
64 512
128 2304
• Encryption-decryption takes much more time for pro-
cessing same text. It can be 100-1000 times slower.
Since asymmetric encryption requires many resources it is
rarely used alone. It can be combined with hash-functions and
symmetric encryption.
3.1.3 Random Number Generators
Random numbers are used in many areas to produce unpre-
dictable results. Cryptography is one of them. For example,
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one of the steps RSA key pair generation a large random prime
is used. A random bit generator is a device or algorithm which
outputs a sequence of statistically independent and unbiased
binary digits. [15]
Basic Random Number Generator (RNG)
RNG can be a computational or physical device which pro-
duces a numbers or symbols sequence. No logic can be found
between parts of the sequence. A (true) random bit genera-
tor requires a naturally occurring source of randomness. Even
though objective looks clear and easy to reach it is a very hard
to produce a real random number. Natural randomness still
stays a subject of influence.
Cryptographically Secure RNG
I will present few definitions to guide in the subject.
A Pseudorandom Bit Generator (PRBG) is a deterministic
algorithm which, given a truly random binary sequence of
length k, outputs a binary sequence of length l  k which
”appears” to be random. The input to the PRBG is called the
seed, while the output of the PRBG is called a pseudorandom bit
sequence [15].
PRBG’s output is not random. The aim is to get very long
sequence out of small truly random one.
A PRBG is said to pass the next-bit test if there is no
polynomial-time algorithm which, on input of the first l bits
of an output sequence s, can predict the (l + 1)stbit of s with
probability significantly greater than 1/2 [15].
A PRBG that passes the next-bit test (possibly under some
plausible but unproved mathematical assumption such as the
intractability of factoring integers) is called a cryptographically
secure PRBG [15].
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Different prime-key cryptography algorithms use different
way to produce cryptographically secure random bits.
3.2 RANSOMWARE
Ransomware is a piece of pernicious software that exploits a
user’s computer vulnerabilities to enter the user’s computer
and encrypt all his/her files, and the attacker keeps the files
locked unless the victim agrees to pay a ransom [16].
The Fig. 3.1 shows that ransomware is getting more and
more popular search term.
I’ll start with history overview in Section 3.2.1. Within the
next Section 3.2.2 I’ll underline the basic principles which are
common for this malware type.
Figure 3.1: ’Ransomware’ search term trend at google
3.2.1 History
Ransomware history dates back to year 1989 when first sys-
tem was infected with such kind of malware. It is known as
PC Cyborg/AIDS Information Trojan. This ransomware was
not developed like a proof of concept. It was a rogue program
which used also other malware well-known techniques. Inter-
net was not used everywhere and to make spread as wide as
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possible author sent a packed containing floppy disk to recip-
ients by post. Most likely PC Business Magazine’s mailing list
was used. It is a good example of social engineering in use. The
message was call ”AIDS Information Introductory Diskette”.
Once program was installed it replaced autoexec.bat with
a different file which counted system reboots. It started
to encrypt user’s hard drive after the counter reaches 90.
Directories were made hidden; file names in system’s root
directory were encrypted. System became unusable. This virus
did not alter the user’s files content; it only changed the file
names.
Ransom for recovery varies depending on the version. User
had to pay $189 - $378 to get his files back. [17, 18]. Payment
had to be made to post box in Panama.
The developer was arrested, he was accused of blackmail.
Next fact which would be interesting to mention is One-
half virus isolation. It happened in 1994. The DOS-bases
polymorphic computer virus was encrypting the hard drive
content. The encryption is done with random key by simple
bitwise XORing. Symmetric cipher was used and virus stored
secret key inside itself. Files can still accessed. Decryption can
be done on-the-fly when file is used [3].
One more virus which left his footprint in Cryptovirology
history is KOH. KOH is a boot sector virus which encrypts a
partition on the hard disk and the floppy. KOH does not try to
hide itself with stealth techniques. It has a very compact and
fast IDEA. It actually was very friendly because it was asking
permission from user on all its actions [19].
Last two viruses had no demand for ransom but they are
interesting from evolution point of view. Both of them were
noticed in 1995.
In 1996 Young and Yung in the article ”Cryptovirology:
Extortion-Based Security Threats and Countermeasures” dis-
cussed the future ransomware trends. At that point there were
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not so much virus examples. Next virus improved all the bottle
necks and spread much wider than his predecessors. Internet
came to each house and it became much easier for criminals to
keep anonymity and spread viruses.
In December 2004 Russian users faced the new Gpcode virus.
Antivirus companies started to get reports from customers that
they have their files encrypted. Users were not able to find
the program which did it and they also had no possibility to
decrypt files.
It is remarkable that only few companies outside Russia
had reported the problem. Virus target were business users:
real estate agencies, banks, insurance and advertising com-
panies. There were few Gpcode’s different versions infection
waves (see Figure 3.2).
First versions used self made encryption algorithm. It
improved from version to version but it was still relatively
simple to crack by virus analysts.
Figure 3.2: Gpcode history chart.
Next version already used RSA encryption algorithm. Gp-
code encrypts files with public key. It is saved inside virus it-
self. Since files were encrypted only a person handling private
key. In case of virus it is the author/owner.
RSA is best known and on the other hand most secure
public encryption algorithm.
Key length was increasing from version to version. Author
started from 56 bits length and in August 2006 key length
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was already 67 bits. Since that time evolution went quite fast.
Gpcode.ae has a 260-bit RSA key length; Gpcode.af already
uses a 330-bit key.
The longer the key, the more difficult it is to crack the key.
For Gpcode.af it took 10 hours already.
The key was growing and it became impossible to break the
encryption using existing computers within a human life. The
way to break Gpcode.ag remained a trade secret. It could help
virus writers it future.
Ransom which Gpcode asks varies depending on the ver-
sion. Sum ranged from $20 to $70 and it should be transferred
via online payments methods.
In August 2010, Russian authorities arrested a criminal
gang. They were accused of spreading a ransomware worm
known as WinLock. It was much simpler than Gpcode,
WinLock did not use encryption. It was just disabling certain
Windows components, making PC unusable and then displays
pornographic images. Tens of thousands of victims were
asked to pay ransom by sending a premium-rate SMS (costing
between $10 to $35) to receive an unlocking code for their
machines. The scam affected mostly users in Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Moldova [20], The gang reportedly earned crooks
as much as $16m in just one month [21].
A ransomware worm which was imitating the Windows
Product Activation notice appeared in 2011. It showed the
message ”This copy of Windows is locked. You may be a
victim of fraud or there may be an internal error” and claimed
that Windows installation should be re-activated. System was
locked until re-activation would be done. They tried to pretend
to be Microsoft. Like in original Windows activation process
an online activation option was offered, but it was unavailable.
The other option was to call to one of six international numbers
to input a 6-digit code. The call was routed through a rogue
operator. The high international phone rates were applied even
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though it was say that they would not. The phone call was set
on hold to cause even bigger long distance charges [22].
During the year 2013 a number of ransomware worms
showed up. They are worth mentioning because each of them
had some unique and first time used characteristics
In February 2013, Stamp.EK was distributed via sites hosted
on the project hosting services SourceForge and GitHub [23].
In March 2013 users in Spain and France were under attack
of ”ArchiveLock” trojan. It uses WinRAR for files encryption
and Sysinternals SDelete for unrecoverable file removal.
In July 2013, an OS X-specific ransomware worm surfaced.
It displays a web page that accuses the user of downloading
pornography [23].
One more worth mentioning worm from 2013 is ”Cryp-
toLocker”. It can be delivered as an e-mail attachment or
as a drive-by download. CryptoLocker works in pair with
command-and-control server. Connection is required. 2048-bit
RSA public and private key pair is generated and private key
is uploaded to the server. Public key is used to encrypt target
files based on files’ extensions whitelist. Ransom can be paid
with either a MoneyPak card or Bitcoin. Due to the extremely
large key size used recovering files is extremely difficult [24].
3.2.2 Basic Principles
Basically ransomware is a worm or a trojan. It usually enters
the system as spam email attachment or downloaded file or
via system vulnerability. The last one may be operating system
issue or hole in software security. Payload might do various
tasks. It might block operating system or browser. It might
just frustrate your work. The other way malware may make
system unusable is by modifying MBR and/or partition table.
This will prevent system from booting. The other option for
demanding a ransom is making users file unusable. This goal is
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reached either by encryption techniques or just using password
protected archives [25].
Ransom ware use scareware techniques to demand money
from user. It can display the notice imitating well-known com-
panies or law enforcement agencies, claiming that user have
been caught on illegal activities such as piracy or pornogra-
phy. I have mentioned all these principles in examples (see
section 3.2.1).
Cryptographic Techniques Used by Ransomware
As we already mentioned one of the option for ransomware
to demand a ransom is to encrypt users’ files. Criminals
use all available techniques to make user helpless and files
unrecoverable without a key.
Some viruses use symmetric cryptography. The simple
layout which describes symmetric cryptography algorithm
looks like this (see Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Symmetric cryptography.
One example which might be examined as classic is .BM-
CODE/.FTCODE. Let’s check the way virus works based on
this sample. This virus had some variations and it was noticed
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in only Russia due to the fact that it was targeted to some or-
ganizations only. Still this is a recent example which might be
considered as classic [26].
.BMCODE/.FTCODE arrives as email spam. It containing
an HTA file attachment. (I’ll list the sources in appendix
A.) File might be either archived with a password provided
in the mail or just contain a pair of Base64 encoded strings.
They can be decoded into two scripts. The first script is
a helper one. It checks whether the system has Windows
PowerShell installed or not. PowerShell is installed by default
to all Windows system later than Windows 7. If check fails, it
downloads installer from a Dropbox.com account and runs it
(see: Appendix A.2).
The second script is a PowerShell script that does all en-
cryption routine. Actually there is no real encryption algorithm
inside the script itself. It just uses ”Rijndael symmetric key en-
cryption” provided by PowerShell’s CreateEncryptor() function
(see: Appendix A.3).
Virus does not encrypt every file, it has a wide list of file
types to apply. The list is removed from the source sample
because it is very big and has 163 values.
The ransom leaves ”READ ME NOW.txt” file in every
encrypted folder. The message is in Russian. It instructs the
victim to visit the web page. The requested ransom is 10000
roubles (around e220).
This virus uses two types of encryption key. The one
in the example uses Universally Unique Identifier (UUID)
(.FTCODE). It might also generate random string 50 charac-
ters long using the PowerShell’s GeneratePassword() command
(.BMCODE) [24, 27].
This virus is quite ineffective due to characteristic of sym-
metric cryptography (see: Section 3.1.1). In this case data can
be easily recovered. I’ll show this later in Section 3.3.2
Let’s switch now to example which uses asymmetric cryp-
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tography. The simple layout which describes asymmetric cryp-
tography algorithm looks like this (see Figure 3.4).
Asymmetric cryptography makes it possible for a malware
to avoid carrying a decryption key that can be captured.
Figure 3.4: Asymmetric cryptography.
I have already mentioned ”CryptoLocker”. This ran-
somware uses asymmetric cryptography. It can be a good ex-
ample to check how such types of viruses work. Actually it
does what most ransomware merely claims to do: it encrypts
the contents of your computer using strong cryptography. The
virus is an executable attachment, but the icon is a PDF file. It
might look like this: SOME FASCINATING NAME.PDF.EXE.
If Windows feature ”hide file extensions” is enabled, then user
sees only ”.pdf” to the end of the file.
CryptoLocker installs itself to Documents and Settings
folder. Name is random. Windows registry entry is also added
for automatic load on start-up.
CryptoLocker uses a solid encryption scheme, some time
ago GPCode used 1024 bits RSA key. For each victim, it
connects to its command-and-control server to download an
RSA public key, which is used to encrypt the data. Keypair
is unique for every victim. One victim - one key. Only the
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Cryptolocker authors have access to the decryption keys [26].
Command-and-control server names are random-looking, but
are generated based on internal algorithm.
The malware uses this public key to encrypt photos, videos,
documents and spreadsheets based on huge list files extension.
Some versions have extended files extension list. Cryptolocker
uses RSA-2048 encryption protected by a private key. All
encrypted file names are stored in Windows registry under
HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\CryptoLocker\Files
Requested ransom is roughly $300 and number of different
payment methods include even Bitcoin. At first, CryptoLocker
used static bitcoin addresses. but later versions dynamically
generate new bitcoin payment addresses for each infection
instance.
Instead of using a custom cryptographic implementation
like many other malware families, CryptoLocker uses strong
third-party certified cryptography offered by Microsoft’s Cryp-
toAPI [29].
Worth mentioning fact is that this virus does not have any
backdoor or shortcut. Due to characteristic of asymmetric
cryptography (see: 3.1.2) only private key can decrypt the files.
Otherwise brute force decryption will take ages [24].
Money Transfer Techniques
The whole point of ransomware is to get money. User should
pay to get malware removed and/or get own files decrypted.
Transfer techniques changed a lot from the first time this virus
type was introduced. PC Cyborg was asking for the transfer to
post box in Panama.
Malware authors used different ways to get money, but
the main goal was to hide them and protect from detection.
Investigating this topic I read about a lot different services and
most of the names are not famous at all. Ukash, MoneyPak,
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Paysafecard, cashU and many others are among the ways of
paying ransom. They are not that famous because you rarely
need to pay anonymously. Of course, wire transfers also have
been used, but in this case complicated arrangements were
used.
One way is also notable: premium-rate text messages and
direct money transfer on phone account. Windows lockers
often use this technique.
The CryptoLocker is remarkable due to the point that it
allowed to use Bitcoin for ransom payment. It is peer-to-
peer payment network and digital currency which is getting
popular nowadays. I think that it has a big future especially in
this area.
3.3 ANTI-VIRUS TECHNIQUES
Strong cryptography implemented correctly does not give you
a chance to decrypt your files. If key length is not long you
can try to ”guess” it, but in most of the cases bad guys to
not make such mistakes. Before taking more precise look on
existing techniques I wish to emphasize one conception: ”never
pay ransom!”. First of all there is no guarantee that you’ll get
your files back and on the other hand paying ransom will only
encourage bag guys. This will encourage them to expand and
strengthen the attack techniques.
The ”prevention” techniques are much better than trying to
recover after attack. User have to keep in mind these simple
ways if not to get full protection, but to minimize damage.
• Stay up-to-date. Keep both operating system and soft-
ware updated.
• Previous point is very important especially for anti-virus
software. Make sure that it is always active. While
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writing this paper I was warned about the viruses in my
appendix, and got files removed. Anti-virus does its job.
• Keep an eye on email attachments, avoid opening from
people you don’t know well.
• Backups. Do them regularly, store safely, preferably
offline. Do not forget that automatic synchronising
services like Dropbox, MS SkyDrive and others may
synchronise and overwrite your file version with most
recent encrypted one. It would be unfair not to mention
that some of those services do provide version control
features and it is still possible to recover old file version.
Some CryptoLocker versions are encrypting not only
local drives but remote ones also.
As always, prevention is the best cure!
As I already emphasised, there are few opportunities to
deal with ransomware and recover from damage. Implemen-
tation mistakes are discussed in Section 3.3.1. Cryptographic
countermeasure comes in next Section 3.3.2. Section 3.3.3 de-
scribed police methods.
3.3.1 Implementation Mistakes
Nowadays internet is well-developed and there are even web-
sites containing tutorials how to write a virus. It is very easy to
start. On the other hand anti-virus applications are available.
There are some good freeware options.
Implementation mistakes are mostly common for primitive
viruses. Often they are created by students. Virus writer’s
groups were examined in previous chapter (see Section 2.1.2).
Virus which have implementation mistakes are not that
famous, because they were detected fast and harm they made
was not serious. Anyway common mistakes are:
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• Not tested code. Surprisingly this is an issue even for
virus writers, who are expected to be professionals. In
real life as I wrote before there are a lot of criminal
who release as soon as it can do at least something
independently. But since the virus is released author
cannot apply any updates on it. It is also important to
mention that current software allows to deploy virtual
testing infrastructure to simulate real condition. This was
not easily available before.
• Implementation complexity. It is harder to create and
debug complicated logic. Modern anti-viruses find
viruses based on the malware goal, but not on the
implementation.
• Lack of document’s properties. Surprisingly often virus
creators forget or do not pay attention to application
properties. Anti-viruses, on the contrary, pay attention
to these properties and if they are missing application
definitely would go to ”suspected” list.
• File creation timestamp. Newly created files are under
a cloud. Windows support three different time stamps:
time the file was created, last accessed and last written.
Clever application would take KERNEL32.DLL creation
time and set same properties via standard Application
Programming Interface (API) function. But New Technol-
ogy File System (NTFS) partitions keep hidden attributes,
which are not available to API functions, but contain file
creation timestamp. This reveals falsification.
• Using undocumented operating systems API functions.
Author sometimes requires using such function. Good
example of such need is ”file wishes to remove itself”.
Such functionality is hard to test on different systems and
it is impossible how it will change after system update.
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• Incorrect or easily noticeable streams usage. I would not
dig in the ways of good implementation. I will focus
on this in Section 5. Usually malware injects itself to
the existing process, causing its own stream. This is
easily noticeable, because memory allocation is usually
done via VirtualAlloc/VirtualAllocEx - in this case it is
taken from dynamic memory, while normal streams work
inside file images and dlls [28].
The cryptography algorithms are widely used and not
only in viruses. So the techniques are well known. Using
popular and well examined algorithms make this ransomware
part protected from anti-viruses. This makes recovery almost
impossible. Many ransomware use common libraries for
encryption. For example, .BMCODE/.FTCODE use PowerShell
method.
Some found mistakes are kept in secret like in case of
Gpcode.ag. Decryption for it is possible but the method is a
trade secret [26]. It could help virus writers it future.
3.3.2 Cryptographic Countermeasure
Story of Gpcode.ag is very mysterious (see: Section 2.1.1 and
Section 3.3.1). It would be nice to uncover the used method.
Maybe it is about implementation mistakes or cryptographic
countermeasure. Who knows, hope that at some point it would
not be a secret anymore.
At this point we cannot proceed with Gpcode.ag investiga-
tion and let’s take a closer look on .BMCODE/.FTCODE. The
encryption part is described in Section 3.2.2.
First of all check the source for used keys. Seems that .BM-
CODE uses computers Universally Unique Identifier (UUID)
and .FTCODE random password which is 50 symbols long
and is located in the file called ”System Product Name” in
C:\Documents and Settings\USER\Application Data.
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Lines 39-41 in A.3 clearly state that only first 40kB are
encrypted. This is enough for decryption which can be done
with script from A.4.
Of course, this example is very simple. Firstly source
code is available and secondly it uses symmetric cryptographic
algorithm.
One notable technique is described in [36]. This technique
identifies the specific cryptographic algorithm in a binary pro-
gram. Cryptography is an important and integral ransomware
part. Even unknown newborn ransom viruses can be noticed
and analysed carefully. In general this eases the analysis.
The referenced paper presents several identification meth-
ods for cryptographic primitives. It is also shown that cryp-
tographic keys can be extracted from a given malware binary.
Knowing the cryptographic algorithms and their usage helps
understand the malicious actions.
3.3.3 Conventional Police Methods
In every modern country it is prohibited to create and spread
viruses and other malware types by law. It is often common
that internet-criminals action fall under a completely non-
Information Technology (IT) laws like fraud, extortion, illegal
access to confidential information, etc. These acts are also used
in practice for cyber-criminals. Every year couple of hundreds
persons get arrested for commiting IT related crimes. It is
worth mentioning that quite often these people are experts, this
seriously impedes the investigation of crimes. On the other
hand lots of attacks remain out of sight due to their relative
insignificance. For these reasons, it is possible to lower the
cyper-crime level with legal methods, but impossible to defeat
completely.
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In order to avoid detection by users and antivirus software,
some malware employ different kinds of deception. Some tech-
niques originate in generic virus methods, some were aimed at
protecting the intellectual property of software developers. Ba-
sically all the methods purpose is to make the malware harder
to understand and to analyse, but on the other hand function-
ality should stay the same.
The harder ransomware detection is - more likely it would
spread wider. It is very important to analyse the hiding
techniques to make malware detection efficient.
I’ll start with self-encryption/decryption technique which
is described in Section 4.1. Polymorphism and oligomorphis
methods in Section 4.2 can be considered as special form of
self-encryption. Section 4.3 is about the metamorphic ap-
proach. Stealth technique is described in Section 4.4. Armoring
method described in Section 4.5 comes from legitimate soft-
ware. Finally, I’ll devote some time to tunneling technique in
Section 4.6.
4.1 SELF-ENCRYPTION AND SELF-DECRYPTION
This approach tries to avoid signature based antivirus scan-
ners detection. For this purpose encryption is used. Simple
encryption is used for malware’s body. Only encryption mod-
ule and a cryptographic key are left as cleartext. Using unique
cryptographic key for every encryption makes encrypted part
unique, thus hiding its signature. Sometimes multiple layers
encryption can be used. Basically even thou virus is the same
every time it still looks different for antivirus software [30].
The encryption might be very simple. Even XORing each
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byte in a virus with a constant would make a trick. It would
fulfil the main requirement. It would make make virus body
different every time.
The only part that remains the same is the decrypting
module. This is the main problem of such approach. Antivirus
scanners can accomplish the detection based on the decryptors
code pattern. To be impartial, this does not make this approach
useless, because decrypter part might be widely used in non
virus related application or even be a part of system application
like in .BMCODE case (see 3.3).
4.2 POLYMORPHISM AND OLIGOMORPHISM
Polymorphism might be consider as special form of self-
encryption. Malware authors took the encrypted viruses short-
coming and invented technology that mutates the decryptor
from one generation to the other.
First versions of this technology were available to change
decryptor slightly. Such malware was called oligomorphic.
This technology allows to generate a few hundreds of different
decryptors, but the are still can be detected with signature
methods.
The polymorphic malware was invented for overcoming
this limitation. This technique was a first real threat to virus
scanners. Warhead for this type of virus/ransomware stays
the same. It infects files with encrypted copy of itself, which is
decoded by a decryption module. But in this case decryption
module is also modified on each infection. Malware has no
identical parts left if technique is implemented correctly. Now
it seems that detection with signatures problem is solved [35].
There are a lot of methods to achieve countless number of
decryptors. These are obfuscation methods including dead-
code insertion, register reassignment, subroutine reordering,
instruction substitution, code transposition, code integration.
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There are even toolkits such as ”The Mutation Engine (MtE)”
which allows you to convert you non-obfuscated malware into
the polymorphic version [30].
Of course, antivirus vendors invented a way to handle
polymorphic viruses. Every instance after decryption has the
same body and this can be used for detection. For this purpose
the emulation technique is used. It allows to execute virus
without any harm. When decrypted virus body is loaded to
memory signature based methods may be applied.
In order to detect and prevent such emulation, the polymor-
phic malware used the armoring technique (see Section 4.5).
However, as the antivirus scanners became matured, they were
capable of addressing this technique, thus effectively defeating
the polymorphic malwares [30].
4.3 METAMORPHISM
The metamorphic approach in malware was developed as an
improvement of the oligomorphic and polimorphic ones [32].
The idea behind metamorphism is to change virus’s content
itself instead of hiding it with encryption. This is done to
prevent detection with emulation. Some viruses are able to
rewrite themselves completely between two infections.
This can be archived in different ways - for example, by
mixing the pieces of code or adding dead-code and unneeded
code sequences to the source code. If the changed sources are
recompiled then malware executable looks totally different.
To implement this routine a metamorphic engine is re-
quired. It makes virus large and complex. In some viruses the
metamorphic part is up to 90% of total amount of lines [31,35].
Note that this malware makes best use of obfuscation
techniques to evolve its body into new generations, which look
different but work essentially the same. For such an evolution,
it should be able to recognise, parse and mutate its own body
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whenever it propagates. It is important that the metamorphic
malware never reveals its constant body in memory due to not
using encryption or packing. That makes it so difficult for the
antivirus scanners to detect this malware [30].
4.4 STEALTH
Viruses which are called ”stealth” do not implement similar
technique. This name is used to describe various approaches.
This main target for such obfuscation is to hide the character-
istics of an infection.
Some viruses try to avoid detection by killing the tasks
associated with antivirus software. One important trick is to
leave ”last modified” date same as it was before the infection.
Nowadays this will not prevent the detection, but if this is not
done than file would be under suspicion.
Some stealth viruses interfere with operating system file
listings so that the reported file sizes reflect the original values
and do not include the size of the virus added to each infected
file [31, 35].
Some viruses can infect files without increasing their sizes
or damaging the files. They accomplish this by overwriting
unused areas of executable files. These are called cavity
viruses. For example, the CIH virus, or Chernobyl Virus,
infects Portable Executable files. Because those files have many
empty gaps, the virus, which was 1 KB in length, did not add
to the size of the file [33].
4.5 ARMORING
Armoring origins from legitimate software which used this
techniques to protect itself from analysis and modification.
These methods were used mostly in anti-piracy and intellectual
property protection. Malware adopted this technique for its
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own needs. The goal of armoring is to prevent anti-virus
software or human experts from analysing the virus’s functions
through disassembly, traces, and other means [4].
Technology develops in the way that it is getting more and
more difficult to reverse engineer and analyse the binaries.
There are a lot of methods which can be used to prevent
disassembly techniques.
The simplest one is debugger detection. On Windows
systems this is done by analysing the Process Execution Block
(PEB) for the presence of the debugger bit [3, 34].
The other popular armoring method is detecting the pres-
ence of virtual machines. This is done because commonly vir-
tual machine are used to simulate a full running environment.
In such ”sandboxes” viruses are isolated and investigated. This
is done because such type of environment can be more easily
controlled than real hardware.
One of the more insidious and difficult to analyse forms of
binary obfuscation is the shifting decode frame. This partially
decodes a running program, executes that code, and then re-
encodes it before executing a new portion. This provides the
greatest difficulty for decoding, disassembling and debugging
[34].
4.6 TUNNELING
Anti-virus software monitors operating system’s API calls to
watch for suspicious activity. Malware with implemented
tunneling is able to intercept low-level operating system calls.
This is done by placing itself to the low level of the operating
system functionality. Having such opportunities virus can
manipulate the operating system and hide itself from anti-virus
software. So in this case malware makes sure that the virus
isn’t being monitored. If monitoring is detected, tunneling
module bypasses it.
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In this case tracing through the API code is done by both
sides: by anti-virus software and by malware itself. The
”tracing” can be implemented in different ways and all these
techniques are also used by anti-viruses.
The static analysis method scans through the code search-
ing for control flow changes. Dynamic methods would single-
step through the code being traced, or use fullblown emula-
tion [35].
Tunneling can only be done when the code in question
can be read, obviously. For operating systems without strong
memory protection between user processes and the operating
system, like MS-DOS, tunneling is an effective technique.
Many operating systems do distinguish between user space
and kernel space, though, a barrier which is crossed by a trap-
based operating system API [35].
In other words, the kernel’s code cannot be read by
user processes. Surprisingly, tunneling can still be useful,
because most high-level programming languages don’t call
the operating system directly, but call small library stubs that
do the dirty work - these stubs can be tunneled into. Anti-
virus software can dodge this issue if it installs itself into the
operating system kernel [35].
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5 Suggestions and Future
Trends
Now it is time to summarise the current situation in cryptovi-
rology. Next Section 5.1 checks the status of ransomware evo-
lution. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 give some suggestions on future
trends in hardware and software correspondingly.
5.1 RETROSPECT
In previous chapters I have described current status of ran-
somware evolution. If we take more precise look on all the
gains this malware type has, we should state that all the nec-
essary problems are solved. Of course, if we go one-by-one
checking all the check boxes with requirements, we might find
a room for improvement, but unfortunately we should state
that ransomware is in perfect shape already.
How the next generation virus may look like? The author
already have all the tools available. I think he just should have
the lesson learnt. Bad guy should look back and pay attention
to all the mistakes in past.
I think that the biggest mistake is untested code. A lot
of powerful creation end-up unnoticed due to mistakes in
implementation. This is a general issue there are a lot of books
and theories on this subjects. Paying attention to this part fully
depends on the author. Saying this I mean that the bottleneck
in testing is not in methods or tools. It is in lack of author’s
time or knowledge.
Main ransomware feature – the encryption part nowadays
reached the level when properly encrypted document cannot
be decrypted in relatively close future. Taking into account
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that in most of the cases victim needs his documents now,
encryption algorithms level is not a problem at all. I am not
sure if there is a desired room for improvement. Of course, it
can be faster, but speed it not a problem. Virus creators can use
open libraries. They are widely available for various purposes
and this will minimise the risk of mistakes in implementation.
The other essential part is malware delivery. It is a pity but
from bad guys point of view it is not a problem at all. Holes
in Java security were a reason for wide-spreading of most
infections in 2013. I can hardly believe that this will change
in near future. In fast, Java is installed on billions of computers
all over the world and it seems that it has a lot of flaws
in security. This makes it so popular among cybercriminals.
Today every set of exploits available on the black market uses
Java drawbacks.
When we talk about delivery mechanisms it would be
wrong to forget and not to mention the social engineering way.
It is widely used and nowadays it is second popular way to
make target infected. So, user itself is the reason for falling
into the trap. This trend is developing due to the fact that IT
is involving new groups of people, who have not been ever
involved to IT life. This makes an average knowledge level
lower. Couple of years ago e-mail was a popular way to spread
malware. Now popularity shifts to social networks. Frauds
often take place there.
The overall picture uncovers one problem which is not
solved yet. Actually it is almost solved, but now it is the
weakest link. I am talking about money transfer techniques.
Various ways were used, but most of them are either not
secure for criminal or not comfortable and easy for the victim.
Now we should remember bitcoins. This peer-to-peer payment
system and digital currency solves the anonymity problem, but
it is not that popular and commonly used among non-geek
users. The request to pay the ransom using paypal would be
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much more comprehensible for average user. Getting used
to bitcoin is a question of time. Something totally new may
appear. We can assume that money transfer problem is going
to be solved in near future. What else might pop-up?
5.2 ARCHITECTURE AND DEVISES
Ransomware may go to mobile. Viruses for mobile phones are
usual already. I think that good ransom virus is coming. An-
droid platform appears to be the best target for cybercriminals.
The main reason for this is operating systems update mecha-
nism. The way Android phone is updated is not straightfor-
ward at all. Three parties are involved: Google, carrier and
phone manufacturer. This is a nightmare. If flaw in security is
discovered, first google should release a fix, than manufacturer
should apply it to its modified version, and next carrier should
deliver it to subscribers. User should rely on all of them. Now
the security factor is not taken into account by most of the
users, but this may change in future. You might need to think
about security when you buy a new phone. I think that coming
year will hold a record of attacks targeted to Android operating
system.
Android malware is developing rapidly and sophistication
increases. Current mobile antivirus detection rate is low
compared to desktop version [43].
Next group of devices which can be under attack are
various Internet-devices. Amount of systems connected to
Internet is growing and this growth will continue. Nowadays
IP-cameras, TVs and multimedia-devices are a part of world
wide web. Due to their specific characteristics they are different
from all the other devises like laptops, smart phones and
tablets. This causes lack attention to them from users. Updates
are very specific and very rarely applied by users. This makes
them vulnerable for security exploits. In near future we might
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observe new types of attack on such devices.
5.3 MALWARE AS A SERVICE
Cybercrime is a big business. I think that in close future
such type of ”service” will become more relevant. Currently
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are popular in
noncompetitive fights. Many websites struggle from them.
Malware as a service can raise this problem to the next level.
Ransomware can freeze corporate life, and not only web part.
Harmful attacks become more and more aggressive. Cryp-
toLocker can be checked as example. The amount of attacks
targets to particular companies is raising. Security rules will
get more strict, current antivirus solutions might not fulfil the
criteria.
Not only companies can be involved in such fight, but
countries also. Economy losses from such attacks are very big
and ransomware might be used for this purpose. Malware is
already used for cyberespionage [37, 41, 42].
5.4 REMARKS
There is no hope that ransomware authors will calm down. I
do not remember any cases when criminals have been caught.
Until this sort of ”business” will bring money and be quite safe
threat will always increase. Coming year will hold a record in
this type of viruses.
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6 Conclusion and future
work
In this work the main subject was ransom viruses. We reviewed
three topics which allowed to observe the overall situation in
this area.
First, I referenced to history part, checked predecessors and
their evolution. Since viruses background is multifarious only
basic milestones were covered. This part gave a clear picture of
viruses classification, their components and countermeasures
against viruses in general. Many problems and their solutions
which are valid for viruses are true for ransomware.
Next, was a technical part, which discribed algorithms
techniques which let ransom viruses to reach their goal. I
covered non-virus related techniques. Those which can be
used in peaceful manner. Actually most of them have such
usage. Also virus specific techniques are covered. They were
initially invented for ransom viruses. This part discribes the
way modern malware reaches its goal. This section contains
some examples which on one hand shown the implmentation
simplicity and on the other hand the great damage which
might be inflicted.
The last part but not least demonstrates the up-to-date
situation and proposes some future trends. These guesses
are made based on the current overall picture and modern
technical development trends. This work encounteres various
problems which have not been solved and many issues will
be raised in near future. This makes this are interesting and
important for future research.
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A .BMCODE sources
A.1 .HTA FILE CONTENT
Figure A.1: .hta file content
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A.2 POWERSHELL CHECK AND SCRIPT DOWNLOADING
It checks whether the system has Windows PowerShell in-
stalled or not. PowerShell is installed by default to all Windows
system later than Windows 7. If check failes then it downloads
installer from a Dropbox.com account and runs it.
Figure A.2: Powershell check and download script
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A.3 .BMCODE ENCRYPTION SCRIPT
Figure A.3: .BMCODE encryption script
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A.4 .BMCODE DECRYPTION SCRIPT
Figure A.4: .BMCODE decryption script
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